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Abstract 
 
 
This paper analyzes recent economic and diplomatic relations between Peru and Asia, with 
emphasis on China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. In the last decade, Peru has experienced 
remarkable economic growth, driven by global demand for its minerals and other natural resources, 
combined with sound macroeconomic policies and a firm commitment to international trade.    
 
Although Peru´s relations with Asia tend to reinforce its overall position as a mineral exporter, the 
country has not experienced significant “de-industrialization”. On the contrary, through aggressive 
pursuit of free trade agreements (FTA) and new foreign investment, trade with Asia has increased in 
scope and diversity, with considerable dynamism in value-added exports to China and Japan. 
Furthermore, Peru´s booming extractive industries have not only benefitted from Asian demand, but 
also from significant new direct investment, and from efforts by Asian firms to comply with global 
standards for mining operations.   
 
Conceding the fact that policymakers can be credited for successful negotiation of FTAs, 
subsequent advances in trade and investment with Asian partners have largely been the result of 
private initiative.  The authors conclude that if Peru is going to take better advantage of these 
opportunities over the longer term, to achieve a more diversified and productive economy, greater 
state leadership and strategic public policies will be necessary.  
 
 
 
Cynthia Sanborn is Director of the Research Center at the Universidad del Pacífico (CIUP) and a 
Professor of Political Science at that university. Alexis Yong is an Associate Professor of 
International Business and a researcher at CIUP who specializes in Asia Pacific trade issues.   
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Introduction 
 
 
“To tell the truth, I also light a candle every day and pray that China´s economy 
does not fall down on us”. 
 
--Luis Miguel Castilla, Peruvian Minister of Economics and Finance 20111 
 
In the last decade Peru has been one of Latin America´s most impressive success stories, 
achieving sustained economic growth under political democracy, cutting poverty in half 
and producing an expanding new middle class.   The country´s recent boom has been driven 
in large part by global demand for the minerals and other primary commodities that Peru 
exports, as well as by sound macroeconomic policymaking and a strong commitment to 
international trade.   Expanding relations with Asia – especially China, Japan and South 
Korea – have been a key part of this story. 
 
For resource-rich countries like Peru, the demands of a growing China in particular have 
offered exceptional opportunities to attract new investment and expand markets for 
traditional exports.  In recent years, copper, iron, gold and other minerals have accounted 
for around 60% of total Peruvian exports, 13% of total FDI
2
 and 14% of total tax revenues
3
.  
Although Western multinationals have accounted for most mineral investment and 
development in Peru since the 1990s, China is the main destination for Peruvian minerals 
and Chinese investment in this sector has increased significantly.  Investors from Japan, 
South Korea and other Asian countries are also present in Peru´s expanding portfolio of 
mineral, gas and oil concessions. 
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Yet the global rush for natural resources has also revived longstanding concerns in Peru 
about the risks of excessive dependency on primary commodity exports, and the structural 
challenges to achieving a more diversified and productive economy. Indeed, the main 
motivation behind Peru´s aggressive pursuit of free trade agreements with China (2009) and 
16 other countries and economic regions, as well as diverse negotiations of multilateral 
trade agreements and alliances, has been to diversify the country´s trade and investment 
opportunities.  Dependency on mineral exports also raises concerns about the human rights 
and environmental implications of large-scale extractive activity, as rising conflicts 
between foreign companies and local communities have generated considerable political 
and economic costs. 
 
Latin American policymakers are aware of the risks of primary commodity dependency and 
anxious to overcome them.  That is the story behind the Pacific Alliance and the Trans 
Pacific Partnership (TPP), as well as initiatives within South America, some older than 
others,  such as the Andean Community (1969), for promoting value added exports between 
member countries, and more recently, the process of physical integration within the 
Initiative for Integration of Regional Infrastructure (IIRSA). The same is true for the 
proliferation of bilateral trade agreements and domestic to diversify productive structure 
and bolster non-traditional exports. That is also the driver behind numerous academic 
initiatives aimed at understanding Latin America´s new Asian partners, in order to take 
fuller advantage of these complex and evolving relationships.  
 
This paper aims to contribute to the regional discussion, through a closer analysis of the 
Peruvian case. The general questions it poses are the following: What has been the nature 
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of Peru´s economic and political relations with the major Asian countries, especially in the 
last decade? Have trade relations with major Asian partners helped or hindered the 
diversification of Peru´s economy? Have Asian investments in Peru encouraged linkages 
between the natural resource sector and the rest of the economy? How or to what extent has 
new Asian investment affected Peru´s efforts to achieve global standards for transparency 
and corporate social responsibility in its mining industry? Finally, how have Peruvian 
policymakers and private sector responded to these new opportunities for engagement with 
Asia? Have they been able to shape these relations in Peru´s favor?  
 
To address these questions, this paper draws on the combined experience of researchers at 
the Centro de Investigación de la Universidad del Pacífico (CIUP) and the APEC Study 
Center at the same university.
4
   It is divided into four main sections. The first provides a 
brief summary of Peru´s historical and political relations with major Asian countries, which 
are important for understanding current relations. The second presents a general overview 
of Peruvian trade with selected Asian partners, and the third analyzes the recent state of 
Asian direct investment in Peru.  In the latter, special attention is given to the growing 
Chinese presence in Peru´s extractive industries.  The paper ends with final remarks about 
the Peruvian case in a regional context.  
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Part I:   Peru – Asian Relations: A Brief History 
 
Peruvian relations with Asia date to the 19
th
 century, when thousands of Chinese and 
Japanese workers were brought to the country in the wake of abolition, to labor on the large 
coastal plantations and other venues.  Asian immigrants and their descendants have 
experienced exploitation and discrimination throughout Peruvian history, yet over time they 
have also achieved considerable economic success and relatively high levels of educational 
and professional achievement.  Today, Peruvians of Asian descent comprise an estimated 
3% to 5% of the population, and their influence on the broader society and culture is 
widespread.  Although Peru now has diplomatic and trade relations with more than 30 
countries across broader Asia, its relations with Japan and China are especially strong due 
to these historical ties, which are frequently cited by each nation´s leaders.     
 
China and Peru
5
 
China has been present in Peru for over 160 years. Between 1849 and 1874, some 100,000 
Chinese men were brought to Peru as coolies or indentured agricultural workers, to labor on 
the sugar plantations and rich guano islands.
6
   Chinese workers also helped build railroads 
and extract rubber and gold from the Amazon.   In 1874, Peru and China signed a Treaty of 
Friendship, Trade, and Navigation, and in 1884 China sent its first diplomat to Peru.   Free 
immigration continued until 1909 when it became officially regulated, and then prohibited 
in 1930.
7
 
 
Throughout the 20
th
 century, however, Chinese immigrants continued to arrive and the 
influence of Chinese people and culture in Peruvian society expanded. In the 21
st
 century, a 
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larger wave of immigrants came along with the huge influx of Chinese goods and 
enterprises.  One of the most visible signs of this influence can be observed in downtown 
Lima, where Chinatown or el barrio chino is located, housing a large conglomeration of 
businesses and shops owned or managed by recent Chinese immigrants or by Peruvians of 
Chinese descent (also called Tusan).
8
 Today Peru has the largest Chinese ethnic population 
in Latin America, and many of its members have renewed ties with their ancestors´ 
homeland.    
 
Diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China can be traced back to 1971, when Peru 
because the third country in Latin America (after Cuba and Chile) to recognize the 
communist state.  For years, however, relations were mainly focused on economic and 
technical cooperation.   In 2004, Peru was among a group of Latin American countries that 
granted market economy status to China.  However, in 2008 bilateral relations entered a 
new phase, when then Chinese president Hu Jintao and his Peruvian counterpart, Alan 
García, exchanged visits and established a “strategic partnership” which in 2009 led to the 
Peru – China Free Trade Agreement (FTA). By 2011, as both countries celebrated the 40th 
anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations, the People’s Republic of China 
replaced the United States as Peru’s main trading partner.  Moreover, in April 2013, the two 
nation´s leaders celebrated their “comprehensive strategic partnership” by signing eleven 
new bilateral accords, aimed to optimize their trade infrastructure, strengthen cooperation 
in agriculture and infrastructure as well as minerals, increase cooperation for social 
development and deepen their ties beyond the current trade structure.   
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Today around 100 Chinese firms are legally registered to operate in Peru, and in 2011 an 
Association of Chinese Enterprises was formed, with 43 members and support from the 
Chinese Embassy in Peru.
9
  The 11 member council includes prominent state-owned oil and 
mining companies (SAPET, CNPC, Shougang, Chinalco, Minmetals), banks and 
technology companies. Peru is now the #1 location for Chinese mineral investment in Latin 
America, with at least 14 Chinese firms holding important concessions, although to date the 
Chinese own only one operating mine.   
 
Japan and Peru
10
 
Peru was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic relations with Japan, in 
1873, and the first country to admit Japanese immigrants in 1899.
11
   The first boatload of 
Japanese families arrived in 1899, followed by several waves of immigrants from Okinawa, 
Gifu, Hiroshima, Kanagawa and Osaka.   Most also came to work on plantations, though 
the majority moved to cities when their contracts expired, and by 1936 they represented 
45% of Peru´s total foreign population.
12
  Today Peru has the second largest Japanese 
descendent ethnic community (or Nikkei) in Latin America after Brazil.  Although they 
comprise less than 1% of the total population, they are highly concentrated in Lima, where 
they have established strong cultural and educational institutions.    
 
Geopolitical factors have shaped the lives of many Japanese Peruvians.  During World War 
II, the Peruvian government collaborated with the United States by deporting hundreds of 
Japanese Peruvians to U.S. internment camps, confiscating their homes and businesses.  
Although 11 other Latin American countries did the same, 84% of the estimated 2,118 
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imprisoned Latin American Japanese came from Peru, and very few returned. While 
roughly 10,000 Japanese remained in Peru during the war, prominent leaders of the 
community were blacklisted, their businesses were boycotted, and their schools and 
newspapers were closed.
13
 
 
In the 1960s bilateral relations between Peru and Japan improved, as the latter turned to this 
region in search of raw materials necessary for its postwar reindustrialization. In the 
following years, trade between the two countries expanded considerably, and Japan became 
Peru´s second largest export market and third largest import supplier.  Around 80% of 
Peruvian exports to Japan were minerals.  And many Japanese enterprises were willing to 
engage in joint ventures and work with government officials to develop new resources in 
exchange for long-term supply contracts.
14
  Although by the 1980s Peru also exported 
fishmeal, oil and coffee to Japan, international and domestic factors drove Peru into a 
severe crisis, and drove most new Japanese investments elsewhere. 
 
Ironically, it was a politician of Japanese descent, Alberto Fujimori Fujimori, who presided 
over Peru´s emergence from the crisis of the 1980s.  When he first ran for the presidency in 
1990 there was a revival of anti-Japanese sentiment among the traditional elite, as 
Fujimori´s successful electoral campaign stressed his humble immigrant story and promised 
to secure generous assistance from his parent´s homeland. The incorporation of other 
prominent Japanese Peruvians to the Fujimori cabinet also brought new attention to this 
community.   Elite fears subsided considerably, however, as the Fujimori Administration 
reestablished order, enacted drastic economic reforms and reopened the country to foreign 
trade.  Peruvian relations with Japan reached a high point during his administration (1990 -
10 
 
2000).  Although some tensions arose between Peru and Japan after Fujimori fled to Japan 
in 2000, taking refuge in his dual citizenship to escape extradition on human rights and 
corruption charges, subsequent bilateral relations have been positive.   
 
In summary, Peru has deep historical ties to China and Japan, which facilitate current 
efforts to promote broader trade and investment.  Recent Peruvian presidents have paid 
state visits to both countries and taken care to celebrate these historical bonds.   Has the 
cultivation of these historical ties paid off in economic terms?   The next two sections 
address this question. 
 
South Korea and Peru 
Official relations between Peru and the Republic of Korea began on April 1
st
, 1963 with the 
signing of the "Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between 
the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Korea." Since then progress has been exponential 
and the bilateral relationship has been extended to the realms of economic, commercial, 
cultural and political cooperation. 
 
The signing of a Free Trade Agreement on March 21
st
, 2011 established a turning point in 
the bilateral relations between Peru and Korea.  These relations were then reinforced by 
mutual visits between Peruvian and South Korean authorities, including a visit to Seoul in 
May 2012 by Peruvian President Ollanta Humala.
15
  Foreign Minister Kim Sung-Hwan also 
visited Lima, promising to promote technology transfer projects and to elevate the 
relationship to a "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" framework
16
. A stated priority for 
both heads of state was the development of new investments, as well as the exchange of 
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knowledge and technology.  Fifty years since the initial establishment of diplomatic ties, 
relations between Peru and South Korea are in their prime.
17
 
 
In this context, in the last three years, through the Korean Trade-Investment Promotion 
Agency (KOTRA) and the Korean International Cooperation Agency of Korea (KOICA), 
Korea has made significant government-to-government arrangements with Peru. Among 
the most important deals is the sale of 20 KT-1 basic trainer aircrafts from Korea 
Aerospace Industries to the Peruvian Air Force, as part of a technology transfer initiative.  
This is being accompanied by the granting of scholarships, student facilities and export 
promotion as well as industrial policy seminars carried out by the Korean Development 
Institute.  As mentioned by ambassador Park Hee-Kwon on November 2012: “Peru is 
therefore an important partner for South Korea, which sees it as a regional hub to increase 
its scientific research and investment in Latin America”.18 
 
 Part II: Peruvian Trade with Asia 
In the last decade, trade with Asia enabled much of Latin America to withstand the 
financial crisis of 2008 and sustain positive growth rates. Between 2004 and 2008, trade 
between Asia and Latin America grew at an average annual rate of 25.7%, while exports to 
the Latin American regional market, the European Union and the U.S., grew at 24.8%, 
20.8% and 20.9% respectively. 
 
Yet although Asia has become the premier destination for Latin American exports, most of 
this trade is concentrated in a few countries. By 2011, six Asian countries explained 79.4% 
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of Latin America´s exports to Asia, being the three main destinations China (47.4%), Japan 
(14.3%) and Republic of Korea (7.9%).  Moreover, the total importance of these three 
countries has remained nearly the same over 1990 – 2011, with a slight increase in the last 
five years.  However, there is a clear change in their relative importance as destinations for 
Latin American exports over the last 20 years.  While in 1990 Japan accounted for 48.2% 
of Latin American exports to Asia, and China just 6.1%, the roles were reversed two 
decades later. 
 
Obviously, this pattern reflects China's gravitational economic force, its hunger for natural 
resources and the ability of Latin American countries to feed that. Indeed, the data on trade 
value is influenced by the increase in commodity prices in recent years.  As a result, the 
relative importance of some export destinations is overvalued due to their trade pattern as 
commodities consumers. 
 
Peru’s trade with Asia follows the general Latin America pattern. In the last two decades, 
exports to the three top destination countries have explained nearly 83% of its total trade 
with Asia, and this has been even more accentuated in the past five years. By 2011, 
Peruvian exports to China, Japan and Rep. Korea accounted for nearly 92% of its exports to 
Asia.  
 
Although these three countries have remained the most significant export partners for Peru 
in the last 20 years, the relative importance of each has not remained the same. Figure 1 
shows us the relative decrease in the export share to Japan and the continuous increase of 
China as the prime destination.  In 1990, exports to Japan accounted for 67% of total 
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exports to Asia, while China accounted for 9 percent. By 2011, Japan accounted for 18% 
while China purchased 59% of Peru´s Asian exports. The Republic of Korea, however, 
remained constant at 10% of Peru´s Asia exports throughout this period, albeit with a 
strong increase in 2011 when it reached a historical record of 14 percent.  As seen below, 
the Rep. Korea plays a significant role not only in the expansion of Peruvian exports with a 
higher technological level, but also in bilateral cooperation at government level.  
 
Apart from the three countries mentioned above, Peru has strong commercial links with 
other countries in the Asia Pacific region. Thailand, the Philippines, Malaysia and 
Indonesia are countries with which Peru also has a history of trade, and the subscription of 
Peru into APEC in 1997 saw a relatively important increase in the share of trade with these 
countries.  However, the effects of the Asian and Russian financial crises in 1997 and 1998 
halted the emergent development of these commercial and investment relations. 
 
As mentioned in the prior section, China has clearly been the most important and dynamic 
partner for Peru, representing its single largest export market, and second largest source of 
imports after the United States.  According to ADEX, the guild of Peruvian exporters, in 
2012 China bought US$7.7 billion worth of Peruvian goods or 17% of total exports from 
Peru.
19
Moreover, total exports to China grew at a 20.6% average annual pace between 1995 
and 2011, for an accumulate growth of 18.9 times, in contrast to Peruvian exports to the 
world as a whole, which grew 7.4 times over the same period of time. 
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Figure 1. Peru exports to Asia, by destination country 1990 – 2011 
(percentage of total exports to Asia) 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN COMTRADE 
 
Peruvian exports to China remain largely primary goods, as seen in Table 1, with just four 
products – copper, iron, lead, and fishmeal – comprising 83% of the total, and largely 
explaining the positive overall trade balance.   The relative share of these goods has 
changed since the 1990s, however.   As recently as 1997, nearly 79.9% of Peruvian exports 
to China came from the fishery sector, while around 16.2% was minerals and oil.  
However, as seen in Table 2, in 2011 the shares were reversed; fisheries accounted for 
17.5% and mineral and oil products together were 78.5%.  This shift in the export pattern 
has been driven by China´s enormous need for minerals in its process of industrialization 
and urbanization. 
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Table 1.  Top 5 Peruvian exports and imports to/from China in 2011 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN COMTRADE 
 
Meanwhile, imports from China to Peru have increased more than those from any other 
country.
20
   In 1993, Peru bought US$ 90 million in Chinese goods, while in 2012 it bought 
nearly US$ 7.8 billion, or 87 times more, while total imports from the world increased 10 
times over.  From 2001 to 2011, imports from China grew by 33%.   
 
Not surprisingly, Chinese imports do compete with local producers in such sectors such as 
footwear, textiles and garments, and metal products, in which the trade balance remains 
negative.   Yet although this trade is highly asymmetric, in the Peruvian case this has not 
exactly led to “de-industrialization”.   The overall effect of an expanded market and better 
access to competitive intermediate goods, for example, appears to outweigh the negative 
Level of 
technologysophisticati
on 
Sector 
Commodity 
Code (HS) 
Commodity Description TradeValue 
Exports 
NRBM Mining&Oil 260300 Copper ores and concentrates  2,417,569,333  
PG Fishing 230120 Flour or meal, pellet, fish, etc, for animal feed 1,042,228,645  
NRBM Mining&Oil 260111 Iron ore, concentrate, not iron pyrites,unagglomerate 1,000,887,459  
NRBM Mining&Oil 260700 Lead ores and concentrates  723,723,644  
PG Mining&Oil 740311 Copper cathodes and sections of cathodes unwrought 623,283,133  
Imports 
HTM 
Metal-Mechanical 
& Electronics 
847120 Digital computers with cpu and input-output units 405,270,468 
HTM 
Metal-Mechanical 
& Electronics 
852520 Transmit-receive apparatus for radio, TV, etc. 375,250,366 
MTM 
Metal-Mechanical 
& Electronics 
871120 Motorcycles, spark ignition engine of 50-250 cc 142,141,509 
HTM 
Various (inc. 
jewelry, crafts) 
852810 Colour television receivers/monitors/projectors 126,808,238 
LTM 
Various (inc. 
jewelry, crafts) 
950390 Toysnes 109,711,716 
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effects of Chinese imports on specific sectors.  A recent study by Cardenas and Gavilano 
(2013)
21
, for example, found that Chinese import penetration
22
 had a positive effect on real 
wages in companies belonging to sectors not directly competing with China, and less 
impact on the wages of workers in those sectors that do compete directly.  Firms that do not 
compete with Chinese products are able to benefit from imports of intermediate goods at 
lower prices and increase their exports by extended market effect and better trade 
relationship. Even in sectors such as apparel and textiles, where Chinese penetration since 
2007 has reached 20% and 28%, respectively, it should be noted that many firms tend to 
manufacture products with a large share of imported components.  Hence the detrimental 
effect of Chinese competition should be weighed at each stage of the production process.   
 
In this sense, the free trade agreements (FTA) signed with China and other partners have 
been very important, motivating more Peruvians to look across the Pacific for new business 
opportunities. The FTA with China, covering merchandise, services and investment, allows 
83.5% of Peruvian exports to enter China with zero tariffs.
23
Importantly, it also provides 
some protection for Peruvian products most vulnerable to Chinese competition, such as 
textiles, 56% of which were excluded from the tariff elimination schedule.   
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Figure 2. Penetration of imports from China into the Peruvian market, by sector 
 
Source: Cárdenas and Gavilano (2013)  
While FTAs alone cannot turn the tide of history in regard to primary export dominance in 
Peru, they have generated new dynamism and modest but important diversification of trade.  
Within the first year of implementation of the FTA with China, for example, the number of 
Peruvian exporters to the Asian giant grew by 30%, to around 500 companies, and total 
trade with China increased 25%.  Although 95% of this was still in traditional exports, Peru 
exported 140 new nontraditional products to China that year.  Particularly in chemical, 
agricultural and fishing sectors which had experienced a remarkable dynamism.  As pointed 
out by Peruvian Minister of Agriculture, Milton Von Hesse at the “First Meeting of 
Ministers of Agriculture of China, Latin America and the Caribbean”, Peru's agricultural 
exports to China grew 8.7 times since the FTA went into effect.
24
 
 
If we analyze the Peruvian export structure by the technological level of the traded goods, 
we can also see (in Table 3) that over the last decade, Peru has increased the technological 
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level of its exports. In 1997, 83.6% were pure primary goods (PG), while 14.4% were what 
is called “natural resource based manufactures” (NRBM).   By 2011 this pattern had 
changed, as 28.9% were primary goods (PG), while 70.5% were natural resource based 
manufactures (NRBM).  Although the majority of the latter are also mineral-related, the 
highest growth rates in this category were in foods and agro-based manufactures. Between 
2005 and 2010 the natural resource base manufactures (NRBM) and the medium 
technology manufactures (MTM), grew at 28.9% and 25% per year respectively. 
 
The structure of exports to Japan follows the same pattern as those of China.  Overall, 
Peruvian exports to Japan grew at an average annual growth rate of 10.3% from 1995 to 
2011, and most have been concentrated in fisheries, mining and oil products.  In 1997, 
fishery exports to Japan accounted for 24.6% of the total, while mining and oil were 57.5%.  
Since then, mining and oil exports have increased to 76.2% as of 2011.  However, there has 
also been an interesting increase in participation of the chemicals sector, which in 1997 
accounted for just 3.9% of exports to Japan, by 2008 was 8.0%, and in 2011 had grown to 
11.5% of the total. Imports from Japan to Peru remain very concentrated in the chemical, 
metal-mechanics and electronics sectors. 
 
Exports to Republic of Korea also followed this pattern until 2008, concentrated in 
fisheries, mining and oil products.  Since then, however, the Peruvian chemical industry 
began increasing its participation in total exports to Rep. Korea.  Furthermore, according to 
UN COMTRADE data, Rep. Korea was the destination with the highest average annual 
growth rate for both high technology manufactures (HTM) and medium technology 
manufactures (MTM).  Between 2005 and 2010, exports of high technology goods to Rep. 
19 
 
Korea grew at 40.9%, while exports of the same technology sector to Japan and China grew 
at –11.9% and 15.7%,  respectively, over the same period of time (see Table 4).   That this 
began before the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was signed between Peru and Rep. of Korea 
in March of 2011 bodes well for the prospects of further expanding nontraditional exports 
to that country.  
 
As we have seen, Peruvian exports to Asia have been historically concentrated in primary 
commodities, especially minerals and hydrocarbons.  To the extent that Asian demand for 
these resources is higher than the world average (60,9% of total Peruvian world exports are 
minerals, versus 78% to Asia), then one can say that this demand contributes to reinforcing 
Peru´s primary commodity orientation.  However, Peru has made notable efforts to offset 
this trend, through bilateral trade agreements, multilateral alliances, and promotion of non-
traditional exports.  Although the trade pattern with China is very concentrated in mining 
and related products, that country has also become a growing destination for Peruvian 
manufactures, with particular dynamism in sectors such as chemicals and agro-industry.  
Moreover, such manufactured exports have grown at a faster pace with China than with 
other destinations; in other words, overall there has been a positive evolution with China as 
a destination for value-added exports.  The challenge is to continue this trend, taking more 
energetic measures to assure that as Chinese demand evolves, it can also become a market 
for higher value-added Peruvian exports. 
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Table 2. Peru exports by sector to Asia main trading partners and the World, 1997, 2008, 2011 
(share of total exports and imports to main destinations) 
 
 China Japan Korea World 
 1997 2008 2011 1997 2008 2011 1997 2008 2011 1997 2008 2011 
 
Agriculture and Livestock 1.8% 0.7% 0.7% 9.7% 1.7% 2.7% 23.0% 4.1% 3.2% 12.0% 8.3% 9.9% 
Chemical 0.0% 0.5% 2.1% 3.9% 8.0% 11.5% 5.4% 0.5% 13.7% 8.1% 15.0% 15.6% 
Fishery 79.9% 22.5% 17.5% 24.6% 9.7% 8.7% 10.1% 7.3% 4.3% 20.8% 7.7% 6.9% 
Metal-Mechanical and 
Electronics 
0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.9% 1.1% 1.0% 
Mining and Oil 16.2% 74.2% 78.5% 57.5% 79.7% 76.2% 58.8% 86.9% 78.2% 45.2% 59.2% 60.9% 
Textile and Leather 2.0% 0.3% 0.3% 3.3% 0.7% 0.9% 2.6% 1.1% 0.5% 8.2% 6.6% 4.4% 
Wood and Paper 0.0% 1.7% 0.8% 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.8% 1.4% 0.9% 
Various (jewelry, crafts) 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 3.6% 0.6% 0.4% 
Total Peru exports 
(in million USD) 
490.6 3,735.0 6,961.4 473.6 1,860.0 2,174.6 91.5 552.0 1,694.9 6,759.4 31,288.2 45,636.1 
 
 
Table 3. Peru export structure to Asia main trading partners and the World, 1997, 2008, 2011 
(share of total exports to main destinations) 
 
  China Japan Korea World 
  1997 2008 2011 1997 2008 2011 1997 2008 2011 1997 2008 2011 
PG 83.6% 25.2% 28.9% 60.0% 24.9% 25.6% 73.7% 9.8% 18.9% 61.5% 47.1% 49.9% 
NRBM 14.4% 74.4% 70.5% 36.7% 74.4% 73.5% 24.4% 89.2% 80.7% 23.7% 41.6% 41.5% 
LTM 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% 3.0% 0.6% 0.8% 1.7% 1.0% 0.4% 10.3% 8.5% 5.9% 
MTM 1.1% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 2.1% 2.2% 2.2% 
HTM 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3% 
Total Peru exports 
(in million USD) 
490.6 3,735.0 6,961.4 473.6 1,860.0 2,174.6 91.5 552.0 1,694.9 6,759.4 31,288.2 45,636.1 
             
 
Table 4.Average annual growth rate of Peru export structure to Asia main trading partners and the World, 1995, 2000, 2010 
 
  China Japan Korea World 
  1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 1995-2000 2000-2005 2005-2010 
PG 5.5% 17.2% 15.7% -6.8% 7.4% 4.2% 5.5% -16.7% 25.0% 4.7% 15.6% 14.6% 
NRBM 3.9% 66.9% 28.9% -5.9% 21.1% 35.1% 4.5% 31.9% 32.9% 2.6% 31.4% 18.9% 
LTM 14.0% 4.2% 18.2% -9.1% 0.4% 1.4% -19.7% 14.5% 12.6% 8.3% 15.3% 5.2% 
MTM -41.0% 78.9% 25.0% 37.5% -17.6% 23.4% 49.3% 82.8% 35.8% 8.8% 19.0% 16.8% 
HTM 878.1% 61.2% 15.7% 1471.8% -1.8% -11.9% 58.1% -17.3% 40.9% 13.7% 11.3% 11.2% 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on UN COMTRADE 
Notes: Sector classified by levels of technological sophistication, as Lall (2000).:PG = Primary goods, NRBM = Natural resources based manufactures, LTM = Low technology manufactures, MTM = Medium technology 
manufactures, HTM = High technology manufactures 
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Part III:   Asian Investment in Peru 
 
It is difficult to trace the total amount of FDI coming from Asian countries into Latin 
America, because of the tendency to use tax havens in Panama and the Caribbean to 
redirect such investments across the Americas.   However, it appears that the appeal of this 
region as an Asian FDI recipient remains less than in that past era.
25
 Without considering 
tax havens, Brazil remains as the top destination for Asian investment, now largely from 
China and Rep. Korea.
26
   This is not surprising, as Brazil has the largest domestic market 
in the region, and strong trade relations with MERCOSUR partners and other South 
American countries to supply with manufactured goods and raw materials.   Mexico is also 
a major destination for Asian FDI, in large part because of its role as a gateway to the US 
and Canada markets through NAFTA
27
, but also because of its Economic Partnership 
Agreement (EPA) with Japan signed in 2005.   
 
Historically speaking, Peru has been an important destination for Asian FDI. Back in the 
1960s, Peru accounted as the second receiver of Japanese FDI in Latin America. However, 
this was gradually lost over the years. By 2012, the main investors in Peru were Spain 
(24.3%), United States (13.3%) and South Africa (7.7%) and the main sector receiving this 
investment was mining, with 23,9% of the total. Asian investment is now led by China who 
constitutes 3.5% of the US$22.7 billion FDI receipt by Peru in 2012.
28
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Japanese investment in Peru: learning from the past   
In the 1960s, Japanese companies went to Peru to ensure market share against possible 
protectionist measures established by the import substitution (ISI) model being 
implemented at the time.  The idea was that Peru might serve as a platform to expand 
vehicle assembly (for Toyota and Nissan) and produced kitchen condiments (Ajinomoto) 
for the rest of the region. 
 
During the same period, there were also significant Japanese investments in the exploitation 
of Peru´s natural resources.  In 1973- 1975 a consortium of Japanese companies (Mitsui 
Mining and Smelting and Nippon Mining) was positioned to purchase at least three major 
copper projects: Katanga, Santa Lucia and Michiquillay.
29
   However, most of these did not 
materialize due to differences with the Peruvian government regarding the management of 
foreign capital and labor policies. In the oil sector, Mitsui, Marubeni and Mitsubishi, 
established JAPECO (Japan-Peru Oil Corporation), to work alongside the state entities 
Cofide and Petroperu to build the North-Peru oil pipeline.  
 
Although considerable Japanese FDI came to Peru between 1965 and 1975, in subsequent 
years the investment and trade relations decreased abruptly.  As mentioned above, these 
were crisis years in Peru and on the international level.   However, during the 1990s, 
political and economic cooperation between Peru and Japan was very active.  Japan helped 
then President Fujimori to revive Peru´s standing in the international community, 
facilitating meetings with international organizations and principal creditor nations.  Peru 
was supported by Japan in its adhesion to APEC in 1997, after which Peru became the 
beneficiary of a series of technical assistance programs.   However, the Japanese private 
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sector was largely absent from Peru.
30
  Few Japanese manufacturing companies retained 
operations in Peru, and those that came in the 1990s opened primarily representative 
offices.  Although there were small mining investments in those years, these were mainly in 
partnership with local or foreign companies.
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Table 5.  Current and announced investments from Japanese companies 
 
Sector Project Japanese Company 
Investment* 
(in million USD) 
Comments 
Mining 
Bayovar Mitsui & Co. Ltd. 1/ 275 (in 2010) 
Holds 25% of Bayovar phosphate mine project. 
Boughtfrom Vale (Brazil) 
Huanzala 
Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co. 
Ltd.  2/ 
50 (in 2011) 
38 (in 2010) 
21 (in 2009) 
Through its subsidiary CompañiaMinera Santa 
Luisa S.A. 
Antamina Mitsubishi3/ n.a. 
BHP Billiton (33.75%)  
Xstrata (33.75%)  
Teck (22.5%)  
Mitsubishi Corporation (10%) 
Quellaveco Mitsubishi  4/ 3300 
Anglo American Quellaveco S.A (81.9%).  
Mitsubishi (18.1%) 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
approved. Probably starting operations in 2016 
Quechua (Espinar, 
Cusco) 
Pan Pacific Copper Corp.,  
JX Nippon Mining Holdings, 
Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co. 
Ltd.  5/ 
490 Exploration 
 
Sources: 
1 / Reuters. "Brazil Vale sells Bayovar stake to Mosaic, Mitsui". March 31, 2010.Gestion, "Japanese Investment in Peru bordering the US$6 billion" 
February 11, 2011 
2 / INEI. "Investment in mining by company: 2009-2011". Retrieved May 8, 2013. 
3 / Antamina.Official Website. 
4 / Ministry of Energy and Mines, "Expected portfolio of mining projects." January 2013. 
5 / Ministry of Energy and Mines, "Expected portfolio of mining projects." January 2013. 
 
* Investment publicly reported. The information may relate to the total amount projected to be invested in the project or the amounts to be disbursed by 
period, in which case the year of planned disbursementis indicated in parenthesis. 
 
Gonzalez Vigil and Shimizu (2012)
32
 propose four main factors that explain the loss of 
Peru’s investment and trade position with Japan between the 1970s and 1990s: (i) human 
insecurity and the presence of terrorism; (ii) high economic instability as a result of 
mishandled economic policies in the second half of the 80s, (iii) geopolitical insecurity and 
strategic distrust that marked the relationship with the U.S. since the 70s and (iv) erroneous 
trade policies taken by Peru during 1975 – 2000. Additionally, Kamiya (2004)33 details the 
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recession in Japan since 1989 and the so-called "lost decade syndrome", as external factors 
that prevented Japanese companies from getting involved in investments in Peru, both in 
the manufacturing sector and in the privatization of public enterprises.  
 
Given the mistakes and limitations of Peruvian policies, as well as negative external 
factors, other countries in Latin America were able to benefit more from Japanese 
investment.  This includes the relocation of automobile manufacturing to Colombia, and the 
ability of Chilean maritime and air transport companies to take the lead in those sectors.  
These phenomena, in turn, had longer term detrimental effects on Peruvian production and 
resulted in loss of competitiveness in global markets.
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By 2013, the main Japanese investments in Peru were in the mining sector. Table 5 
summarizes the main current and announced investments by Japanese companies.  As can 
be seen, almost all of these are held as minority shareholders alongside other foreign 
investors. 
 
South Korea investments in Peru: partnership for the future 
Closer Peruvian – Korean diplomatic ties have helped to promote new investments and 
business ventures.  An “Invest in Peru” road show held in Seoul35 in April 2013 attracted 
considerable interest by Koreans, for example, in investing in transportation infrastructure 
(Intelligent Transportation System, Line 2 of Lima Public Transport Bus Network), in 
energy-related technical associations (South Andean Gas Pipeline) and also in sharing 
experiences in industrial development.  
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Table 6.   Current and announced investments from Korean companies 
 
Sector Project Korean Company 
Investment* 
(in million USD) 
Comments 
Oil& 
Gas 
Block Z46  
(Trujillo basin, La 
Libertad) 
SK Energy 1/ 482.62 Exploration in progress 
Block 8 
(Trompeteros y 
Yanayacu, Loreto) 
SK Energy,  
Daewoo,  
Korea National Oil Corporation 
(KNOC) 
2/ 
n.a. 
Project in production phase.  
Korean interest is divided in: SK Energy 8.3%, 
Daewoo 11.6%, Korea National Oil Corporation 
(KNOC) 20%. Pluspetrol Norte S.A. holds 60% 
of the project and is property of Pluspetrol 
Resources Corporation (55%) and China 
National Petroleum Corporation, CNPC (45%) 
Block 115  
(Datem del 
Marañón, Loreto ) 
Korea National Oil Corporation 
(KNOC)    3/ 
n.a. 
Project in exploration phase.  
Korea National Oil Corporation, KNOC 30%, 
Pluspetrol 70%.  
Savia Peru  
Block Z-2B 
(Talara,Piura) 
Korea National Oil Corporation 
(KNOC)   4/ 
n.a. 
Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC) 50%, 
Ecopetrol 50%. Project in production/exploration 
phase 
Mining 
Mina Justa 
KoreaResources,  
LS-Nikko Copper  5/ 
744 
Environmental impact assessment (EIA) 
approved. Starting operation in 2015 
Brescia Group (CumbresAndinas) 70%, 
 Korea Resources 15%,  
LS-Nikko Copper 15%.  
San Juan de 
Marcona, 
Pachapaqui 
Korea Zinc 6/ 200 In progress 
DesalinationPlant - 
Cerro Lindo 
Doosan 7/ n.a. To be completedby 2013 
Fishery 
Pesquera Diamante 
S.A. acquisition 
Dongwon Industries Co 8/ n.a. Notconfirmed 
 
Sources: 
1 / Central Reserve Bank of Peru. "Inflation Report March 2013": 
2/3/4 / Korea National Oil Corporation, Operations 
5 / Andina. "Korean firms investment in Peru would sum US$ 6.600 billion." August 12, 2011. 
6 / Peru 21, "South Korea wants to invest in the energy sector in Peru". February 26, 2012.Ministry of Energy and Mines, "Expected portfolio of mining 
projects." January 2013. 
7 / Doosan."Doosan water plants".Retrieved May 8, 2013. 
8 / Business Week. "Reportedly Eyes Dongwon Fisheries, Dongwon But Does Not Disclose Confirms Target Name". Retrieved May 8, 2013. 
 
* Investment publicly reported. The information may relate to the total amount projected to be invested in the project or the amounts to be disbursed by 
period, in which case the year of planned disbursementis indicated in parenthesis. 
 
 
Yet despite the efforts made by both governments to foster technology transfer and 
industrial development, to date the majority of investment by South Korean firms in Peru 
has focused on the extractive industries (see Table 6).  Oil and gas operations have been 
leaded by SK Energy, who has undertaken projects in the Peruvian Amazon as a partner 
with the much larger China National Petroleum Company (CNPC).   In the mining sector, 
the Korean presence is still small in comparison with current and projected Chinese and 
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Japanese investment; however, it is notable that Korean interests have participated in the 
Mina Justa project with one of the main economic groups in Peru.   
 
For Peru, the long-term prospects for Korean investment should be concentrated in areas of 
bilateral cooperation that would help improve domestic production chains and help expand 
Peru´s industrial base, with higher added value and returns.  Yet in spite of the efforts made 
by the Peruvian government to expand trade with Korea, the private sector still looking for 
clearer incentives to follow this initiative. 
 
Chinese investments in Peru: learning by doing  
Chinese investment in Peru was virtually nonexistent until 1992, when the Shougang Group 
bought the state-owned iron ore company, Hierro Peru.  At the time it was the largest 
Chinese investment in Latin America, at US$118 million, and the first state enterprise sold 
off by the Fujimori Administration.
36
  In 1993 Sapet, a subsidiary of the China National 
Petroleum Company (CNPC) also purchased some state-owned assets in the Peruvian oil 
industry.   Yet fifteen years would pass before more significant Chinese investments would 
flow into Peru.  
 
By the mid-2000s, the Chinese government´s “Go Out” policies were taking effect in this 
region.   In 2007 and 2008, three of Peru´s largest new copper concessions passed into 
Chinese hands.
37
  This includes Toromocho, one of the world´s richest copper claims, 
which requires the relocation of an entire city as well as considerable investment in 
environmental remediation.   To date at least 14 Chinese firms, primarily state-owned but 
also some with private or mixed capital, have invested in mineral projects in the Northern 
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and Central Highlands, and in hydrocarbons in the Amazon.  In 2012 China was still only 
the 10
th
 largest foreign investor in Peru, but was the largest single investor by country in the 
mining sector, representing around 20% of total FDI in that sector. 
 
The majority of Chinese investments are concentrated in copper and iron, and since 2007 
they have involved new concessions purchased directly or through the takeover of junior 
firms.  The majority are still in the exploration stages, though Toromocho – the largest 
Chinese investment to date at US$ 2.15 billion – is now under construction.  The Chinese 
still have only one operating mine in Peru - Shougang Hierro Perú. 
 
While extractive industry investments have been predominant, Chinese investors have 
begun to show interest in other sectors of the Peruvian economy.  One well-known case 
was the application of Hutchison Port Holdings to an operations bid for the Port of Callao 
North Pier.   Although the tender was won by APM Terminals, a subsidiary of A.P. Moller-
Maersk Group, there is interest from Chinese investors in entering the logistics sector and 
other areas related to overall development of the Peruvian economy.
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However, interviews with businessmen and diplomats from both countries suggest that 
there are numerous obstacles for Chinese state-owned firms, and also for individual 
entrepreneurs, wishing to invest more in Peru.   Some of these are related to Peru´s basic 
regulatory requirements for all investors, which may nonetheless seem especially 
cumbersome for Chinese unfamiliar with the region.  This includes such chores as 
obtaining work visas, translating and officiating documents and obtaining permits for 
various stages of operation. Tender processes for infrastructure investments also tend to be 
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very complicated for Chinese investors.  There are also some personal challenges, such as 
long delays in obtaining visas for family members.   
 
Table 7. Current and announced investments from Chinese companies 
 
Sector Project Chinese Company 
Investment* 
(in million USD) 
Comments 
Mining 
Toromocho Chinalco Peru (Chinalco) 1/ 2150 Possiblycompletedon 2014 
El Galeno 
China MinMetalsCorporation 2/ 
2500 
Possibly completed on 2014-2015 
China MinMetals Corporation (60%), 
Jiangxi CopperCompany Ltd. 3/ Jiangxi Copper Company Ltd.(40%) 
Extension of 
Marcona mine 
ShougangHierro Peru 
(Shougang Corporation) 4/ 
1200 In progress 
Pampa de Pongo Nanjinzhao Group 5/ 3005 Investmentover 2010-2014 
Rio Blanco 
Zijing Mining Group 6/ 
Tongling Nonferrous 7/ 
Xiamen C&D 8/ 
(former Monterrico Metals y 
Majaz)  
1500 
Investment over 2009-2014.  
Zijing Mining Group(45%) 
Tongling Nonferrous (35%) 
Xiamen C&D (20%) 
Mina Justa CST MiningGroupLimited 9/ n.a. 
Until 2012. Afterwards sold their participation 
(70%) to CumbresAndinas 
Cercana project 
(Yarabamba, 
Arequipa) 
JunefieldGroup 10/ to be defined Exploration 
Llama TY01 
(Huancano, Ica) 
JintongMining 11/ to be defined Exploration 
Marcobre China SciTech 12/ n.a. Exploration 
  Shandong Exploration  13/ n.a. Exploration 
  Anhui Exploration  14/ n.a. Exploration 
  Hebei Exploration 15/ n.a. Exploration 
Oil& 
Gas 
Block 6 / 7 (Talara, 
Piura) 
China 
NationalPetroleumCorporation 
(CNPC)   16/ 
n.a. SinceJanuray 1994 and October 1995. 
Block 111/113 
(Madre de Dios) 
China 
NationalPetroleumCorporation 
(CNPC)   17/ 
n.a. Project in explorationphase 
Block 1AB  
(Olaya, Loreto) 
China 
NationalPetroleumCorporation 
(CNPC)   18/ 
n.a. 
Already in production. 
Holds 45% of the project. Pluspetrol Resources 
Corporation holds the 55%.  
Block 8 
(Trompeteros y 
Yanayacu, Loreto) 
China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC)    19/ 
n.a. 
Already in production.Holds 27% under its stake 
in Pluspetrol Norte S.A. Other partners are SK 
Energy (8.3%), Daewoo (11.6%), Korea National 
Oil Corporation, KNOC (20%) and 
PluspetrolResoruces Corporation (33%).  
 
Sources: 
1 / Andina. "Chinalco and Shougangwill invest more than US$ 3,000 million in Peru since 2010." November 23, 2009. 
2 / Gestion. China Minmetalswill run project to exploit gold and copper.Retrieved March 8, 2013. 
3 / El Comercio. Jiangxi Copper estimated Galeno project to commence production between 2014 and 2016. March 28, 2012. 
4 / BN Americas.Expansion in Marcona and new players will quadruple Shougang iron ore in Peru to 2016. January 17, 2013. 
5 / BN Americas.Expansion in Marcona and new players will quadruple Shougang iron ore in Peru to 2016. January 17, 2013. 
6 / 7 / 8 / Sanborn and Torres (2009).Gestion. Chinese Mining to invest US$ 7.400 million in Peru. Retrieved May 8, 2013.Andean.Chinese mining giants to 
invest US$ 7.4 billion in Peru over next 5 years. May 11, 2009. 
9 / Financial Times. "CST Mining Group Ltd". 
10 / Ministry of Energy and Mines, "Expected portfolio of mining projects." January 2013. 
11 / Ministry of Energy and Mines, "Expected portfolio of mining projects." January 2013. 
12 / 13 / 14 / 15 / Irwin and Gallagher (2012) 
16/17 / China National Petroleum Corporation.CNPC in Peru. 
18/19 / Pluspetrol Norte SA partners 
 
* Investment publicly reported. The information may relate to the total amount projected to be invested in the project or the amounts to be disbursed by 
period, in which case the year of planned disbursementis indicated in parenthesis. 
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More specific obstacles to attracting investment from China stem from problems of 
compatibility between the Chinese and Peruvian tax and legal frameworks and financial 
systems.  This is made worse by the lack of professionals on both sides with appropriate 
language and cultural skills.  
 
At a higher level, a serious challenge lies in the fact that although Peruvian policymakers 
have been successful at negotiating free trade agreements and other state – to – state 
accords, Peru does not seem to have as clear a strategy for following up on these 
opportunities, and the Peruvian state does relatively little to accompany, finance or 
otherwise support private entrepreneurs in this process.  Indeed, although non-traditional 
export promotion is a stated objective of Peruvian authorities, it has not been given the kind 
of sustained attention and investment it requires in the current competitive environment.  
The drastic neoliberal reforms of the 1990s, enshrined in a new Constitution, have left a 
legacy of aversion to any state-guided industrial policies, or systematic investment and 
export sector promotion efforts.  As a result, most business with Asia today is being driven 
by private companies and individuals with little assistance from government, thereby losing 
opportunities for better negotiation and better deals.
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Once a tender offer is won, and once the Chinese investors have complied with initial 
central government rules and regulations, they then find that they may have to 
communicate – and negotiate – with a large number of other parties.   Depending on the 
type of investment, these may include popularly-elected regional and municipal authorities, 
indigenous communities, non-governmental organizations (NGO) and diverse media, as 
well as local bankers and business competitors.  Such diversity of actors is normal in a 
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volatile democracy like Peru and successful Western investors have learned over time how 
to respond to them.   Yet Chinese businesspeople and diplomats are less experienced at 
multi-stakeholder relations and less accustomed to demands for accountability from non-
state actors.  However, as recent studies of Chinese investment in the mining sector 
suggest, they are learning quickly.
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Latin America today accounts for nearly a third of total world mineral investment, and a 
growing share of this is expected to come from Chinese-owned firms, which own or 
participate in at least 35 major projects across South and Central America.  As mentioned at 
the outset, policymakers in this region are concerned not only with avoiding the negative 
macroeconomic effects of excessive dependency on mineral exports.  They are also 
concerned with issues of revenue transparency, with achieving adequate environmental and 
labor standards in the industry, and with having companies practice good community 
relations and corporate social responsibility.    
 
Have Chinese state-owned firms reacted any differently than their peers in the industry, to 
social conflicts and to changing regulatory demands?   This is the subject of ongoing 
research on both sides of the Pacific, and there is not space here to respond in detail.
41
  
However, we can say that in the initial cases in Peru, neither the Chinese investors nor their 
diplomats did due diligence on the conditions they would face, and Peruvian authorities 
may not have been forthcoming about these as well.  This is especially the case in the North 
of Peru, where resistance to mining per se is high.    
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Meanwhile, in the case of Shougang, there were definitely mistakes made in engaging with 
the local union and municipal authorities, conflicts around labor rights and water 
management, with a reluctance to invest the time and money necessary to clean up the 
operation and engage various stakeholders adequately
42
.  Although the Chinese government 
has a strong interest in making these investments work, they may have initially been too 
inexperienced, or too far away, to guide these such efforts.  
 
Nonetheless, what we are observing today are processes of learning, on the part of Chinese 
investors and their political allies.  This includes learning from other Chinese, from other 
firms in the industry, and from hiring the best managers and consultants in Peru to guide 
them through the process.  Even Shougang, perhaps the most widely criticized Chinese 
mining case in South America, has made notable efforts to correct its errors, as well as to 
invest new resources in its operation.  
 
At present, however, the most widely watched case is Toromocho, where Chinalco has 
committed to building a state-of-the art mining operation, a new water treatment plant, and 
carrying out a process of voluntary and participatory relocation, moving an entire town to 
new quarters in which living conditions are expected to improve for all.  This has never 
been done before in Peru, and is apparently rare in China as well.  For China, and for Peru, 
this project should show the world that both sides are serious about global standards.  Only 
time will tell if this is the case.   
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Part IV:   Final Remarks 
 
As stated at the outset, this paper aims to contribute to regional discussions about the nature 
and impact of Latin American relations with Asia, taking into account the diversity of 
countries that comprise that broad region as well as the commonalities that might emerge.   
 
The underlying concern in the region is whether recent economic and trade relations with 
Asia help or hinder Latin American efforts to achieve sustained growth, diversify their 
economies and raising living standards for their populations.   For some, including most 
heads of state, trade and investment with Asia is seen as an enormous opportunity to 
advance all of these goals.  For others, however, the voracious Asian demand for raw 
materials brings the risk of greater Latin American dependency on primary commodity 
exports, and the displacement or undermining of national industries.  
 
In the Peruvian case, as we have seen, there are deep historical ties with China and Japan, 
which facilitated the close relations being forged with both countries today.  However, Peru 
has also opened new channels of interaction with South Korea and numerous other Asian 
partners.  Trade with Asia in general, and China in particular, has contributed to Peru´s 
booming economy over the last decade, and to its ability to weather the effects of the global 
financial crisis. 
 
As we analyze the data – and the dynamics – of these relationships, we find that although 
Peru´s trade with Asia tends to reinforce its overall position as a mineral exporter, the 
country has not experienced significant de-industrialization.  To the contrary, through 
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pursuit of free trade agreements and new foreign investment, trade with Asia has increased 
in scope and diversity, with considerable increases in nontraditional exports to the region as 
well as traditional minerals, fisheries and foodstuffs.  In fact, manufactured exports have 
grown at a faster pace with China than with other destinations. And although the relations 
are highly asymmetrical and not all sectors of the Peruvian economy have benefitted – 
those that face direct competition from Chinese imports have of course had a harder time – 
the net effect of expanded markets and access to lower priced intermediate goods appears to 
be positive for Peruvian industry.  
 
We should also note that nontraditional export values have not been subject to the dramatic 
price fluctuations that affect primary goods, and instead are part of a genuine trade 
expansion and diversification effort. The commodity boom would have taken place with or 
without the FTAs: what these have done is enable diversification of trade in other goods, 
even with a context of high world minerals prices.  Meanwhile, new investment from Asia, 
backed by state banks in the Chinese case, has enabled Peru to develop large-scale mineral 
projects with important spinoffs in other sectors of the economy, even amidst a context of 
global uncertainty.   
 
Although Peruvian leaders and trade negotiators have been successful in obtaining new 
trade agreements, and the private sector reaction to these has led the economy forward, not 
backwards, political leadership and strategy have been lacking in the follow-up to these 
accords. On the most basic level, we find excessive bureaucratic obstacles to Asian 
investment in Peru, and a limited effort or ability to prepare the way for newcomers and 
their potential clients and stakeholders.  Most public servants lack the necessary language 
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or cultural skills to assist Asian companies and professionals wishing to do business in 
Peru, or vice versa.  And to date the Peruvian government has invested virtually nothing in 
developing research or training Peruvians in knowledge and skills needed to engage with 
Asia over the longer term.   
 
On a higher level, once the State visits have ended and the agreements signed, there has 
been little effort to coordinate trade, investment and economic development policies to take 
better advantage of Asian opportunities. For example, more pro-active public policies are 
needed to enhance the industrial capabilities of Peruvian firms in nontraditional sectors, and 
synchronize private actions.   Government should work with firms and guilds to obtain 
better negotiation positions vis-à-vis Asian partners, and to expand cooperation in areas 
such as technology transfer and capacity building. In many parts of the country there is a 
serious lag in infrastructure – ports, airports, roads and transportation systems, water and 
energy – all of which is needed to accompany and expand new private investment.   With 
the mining sector itself, more needs to be done to encourage clusters, organize the many 
firms that supply goods and services to the industry, and generate opportunities for many 
more people.   
 
Peru has made enormous strides across the Pacific, but they are still tentative steps.  
Without greater leadership, coordination and strategy, without more investment of time and 
resources from government, trade agreements will remain superficial and their longer term 
benefits will not be fully realized. 
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